Early research on the Taylor rule typically divided the data exogenously into pre-Volcker and VolckerGreenspan subsamples. We contribute to the recent trend of endogenizing changes in monetary policy by estimating a real-time forward-looking Taylor rule with endogenous Markov switching coefficients and variance. The response of the interest rate to inflation is regime dependent, with the pre and post-Volcker samples containing monetary regimes where the Fed did and did not follow the Taylor principle. While the Fed consistently adhered to the Taylor principle before 1973 and after 1984, it followed the Taylor principle from 1975-1979 and did not follow the Taylor principle from 1980-1984. We also find that the Fed only responded to real economic activity during the states in which the Taylor principle held. Our results are consistent with the idea that exogenously dividing postwar monetary policy into pre-Volcker and post-Volcker samples misleading. The greatest qualitative difference between our results and recent research employing time varying parameters is that we find that the Fed did not adhere to the Taylor Principle during most of Paul Volcker's tenure, a finding which accords with the historical record of monetary policy.
Introduction
The Taylor principle, that the Fed and other central banks should increase the nominal interest rate more than point-for-point with inflation, so that the real interest rate increases when inflation rises, has become a central tenet of monetary policy. As exemplified by Greenspan (2004) , the Fed explicitly recognizes that satisfying the Taylor principle is necessary for achieving its mandate of stabilizing inflation independent of whether or not it follows a particular policy rule.
While there is an extensive literature on whether or not the Taylor principle holds during different periods, early research on the subject typically made the choice of sub-samples exogenously, usually to correspond with the tenure of various Federal Reserve Chairmen. Taylor (1999) estimates rules over the 1960: 1 -1979 :4 (pre-Volcker) and 1987 :1 -1997 periods, and finds that the coefficient on inflation is greater than unity, so that the Taylor principle holds, only in the latter period. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) divide their sample into the 1960: 1 -1979 :2 (pre-Volcker) and 1979 :3 -1996 periods, and also find that the Taylor principle holds only in the latter period. Their results are robust to various measures of the output gap and to excluding the first three years of the Volcker regime.
While the initial research on Taylor rule estimation used revised data, following the work of Orphanides (2001) it has become standard practice to use real-time data that was available to policymakers at the time that interest-rate-setting decisions were made. Orphanides (2004) , using real-time data, estimates Taylor rules for the 1965 :4 -1979 :2 (pre-Volcker) and 1979 :3 -1995 (Volcker-Greenspan) periods. In contrast to earlier research with revised data, he finds that there was no significant difference in the interest rate response to inflation between the pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan periods, with the Taylor principle being satisfied during both periods. In addition, he finds that the interest rate responded to the output gap during the pre-Volcker, but not the Volcker-Greenspan, periods. Thus, while they differ on their characterization of the conduct of monetary policy, Taylor (1999) , Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , and Orphanides (2004) all explicitly divide the sample by the tenure of the Fed Chairmen.
More recent research has questioned both this exogenous choice of subsamples and the characterization of the conduct of monetary policy as pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan. and, from the mid-1980s on, responded strongly to inflation and weakly to real activity. Kim and Nelson (2006) also estimate forward-looking Taylor rules with time varying coefficients, using ex-post data.
1 Their empirical results suggest that the conduct of monetary policy since 1970 can be divided into three periods: 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. Leeper (2006, 2011) estimate a Markov-Switching Taylor Rule with The results contained in these studies suggest that each pre and post-Volcker subsample contains more than one monetary regime. Indeed, Kim and Nelson (2006) 1965:4 -1972:4, 1975:1 -1979:3, and 1985:2 -2007:4 . In addition, the coefficient on the output gap is only significant in the stable Taylor rule state.
A seemingly anomalous result is that, with the exception of 1973:1 to 1975:1, we estimate that the Taylor principle held during almost all of the Great Inflation. This is in accordance with Orphanides (2004) , who shows that, using a forward-looking model with inflation forecasts, the Taylor principle holds for the 1970s. In contrast, Nelson (2005) and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy and Papell (2011) show that, when actual inflation rates are used, the Taylor principle does not hold for the same period. None of these papers, however, chooses the sample period endogenously.
A major theme of this paper is that, by using Markov switching methods, we are able to choose policy regimes endogenously rather than impose regimes exogenously based on different Federal Reserve chairmanships. A direct comparison of our results is with Orphanides (2004) who, using real-time data, finds that the Taylor principle held in both the pre-Volcker and the inflation/unemployment policy tradeoffs which finds policy episodes initiated by switches to more accommodating regimes that Granger-cause NBER recessions. Boivin (2006) , or Kim and Nelson (2006) . Specifically, Boivin (2006) and Kim and Nelson (2006) find a change toward following a stabilizing Taylor rule in 1980, whereas we estimate that this did not occur until mid 1985.
A Markov Switching Model for the Taylor Rule
Following Taylor (1993) , the monetary policy rule postulated to be followed by the Fed is Greenspan (2004) , the Taylor principle is essential to the conduct of monetary policy independent of the specific form of the Taylor rule. Suppose that ω was equal to zero, so that the Fed only responded to inflation and not to the output gap.
The condition for the Taylor principle would be unchanged.
In order to derive a model which can be estimated, we modify equation (2) 
where ρ is the degree of smoothing. The more instantaneous the response to the shocks, the more ρ tends to zero. Substituting (3) into (4) and allowing the parameters to switch between the two regimes, we get the following two state specification for the nominal interest rate:
The unobserved state variable takes on the values zero or one:
. We specify Gaussian innovations, with state dependent variances,
where the unobserved state variable is governed by the following transition probabilities: Sims and Zha (2006) argue that if the variance is assumed to be constant, one may find spurious structural change in the slope coefficients in monetary policy rules. We allow the Gaussian errors to be heteroskedastic to sidestep this problem.
Real-Time Data
Our real time inflation forecasts come from the Greenbook dataset, which is available from the Philadelphia Fed website. 4 The Greenbook forecasts are published with a five year lag and, as of the writing of this paper, end in 2005:4. We extend the Greenbook forecasts through 2007:4 by splicing them with inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
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The inflation forecasts are predictions of the annualized quarter-over-quarter growth rate of the GNP/GDP price level. To estimate a Taylor rule, we need year-over-year inflation rate forecasts.
We thus transform the Greenbook/SPF data by taking the average of four consecutive quarterover-quarter forecasts. We then have using all data that was available at the time to estimate the trend.
Empirical Results
We estimate Equation (5) using Hamilton's (1989) algorithm for the nowcast and four forecasts of inflation. We use the average Federal Funds Rate in the final month of the quarter as our nominal interest rate. We allow the constant term, as well as the coefficients on expected inflation and the output gap, the interest rate smoothing parameter, and innovation variance to be regime dependent. We first demonstrate that our estimates from a Markov switching Taylor rule suggest two separate regimes. We then determine that the Taylor rule parameter, δ , in equation (1) is indistinguishable from zero in one of the regimes and significantly positive in another. The parameter estimates are reported in Table 1 . In state zero, the coefficient on inflation, δˆ, is negative for every inflation forecast. The Taylor principle that 1 ) 1 ( > + δ is clearly not satisfied, as the Fed did not raise the nominal interest rate more than point for point in response to higher inflation forecasts. As shown in Figure 1 , there were a number of times when the nominal interest rate fell as inflation rose, which may explain why the estimates of δ are all negative in state zero, albeit insignificant. 6 We use the typical convention of calling a regime change when the smoothed probabilities cross one-half.
In contrast, state one implies a significant and positive value of δ for every inflation forecast, suggesting that the Fed followed a stabilizing Taylor Funds rate during this period. This empirical finding, however, is in contrast with recent research on estimated Taylor rules. We will return to this in the next section.
The second major component of the Taylor rule is that the Fed raises/lowers the nominal interest rate when the output gap is positive/negative. We find that the response of the interest rate to the output gap across all inflation forecast horizons was larger when the Taylor principle held. In State 1, the coefficient ω ranges from 0.49 to 0.61 while, in State 0, ω ranges from 0.40 to 0.57. In addition, ω is always highly significant in State 1 while, in State 0, ω is most often only marginally significant. The difference in significance levels, however, may be driven by low power of the tests in State 0, given the short amount of time spent in that state.
We find that there is much more interest rate smoothing in the stable Taylor rule state. The typical ρ in state zero is about 0.5, compared to around 0.8 when the Fed follows the Taylor principle. Not surprisingly, the estimated innovation standard deviation is about 4 times larger in state zero than in the stable state one. We also report estimates of the implied inflation target * π .
Since the constant term depends on the inflation coefficient, the inflation target, and the equilibrium real interest rate, we assume that the equilibrium real interest rate equals 2.5% and back out an implied inflation target using the estimated inflation coefficients. Taylor (2000) has argued that the real-time CEA output gap estimates from Orphanides (2004) that we utilize in Table 1 were affected by political influence during the 1970s and that neither economic analysts nor policymakers paid serious attention to these estimates. For these reasons, we consider an alternative real-time measure of the output gap based on recursive quadratic detrending, which has become a common method of constructing output gaps for
Taylor rules. 8 For this measure of the gap, the observation at time t uses data up through time t -1, so that it is available to the policy maker in real time.
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We present our parameter results for the quadratic output gap in Table 2 and Figure 8 While linear detrending was commonly used in the 1970s to measure U.S. postwar output gaps, it is no longer considered an appropriate method of detrending by those who espouse deterministic detrending. Growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s were higher than in the 1970s and afterwards, causing every output gap after 1973 to be negative. Murray and Nelson (2000) raise a similar criticism of linearly detrending output, as it implied that output was continuously falling below trend from 1991-1998. 9 Cecchetti et al. (2007) and Levin and Taylor (2013) utilize a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered real-time output gap measure. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy and Papell (2011) show that this measure produces unreasonably small real-time output gaps for the 1970s, even if the end-of-sample problem is corrected as in Watson (2007) recession. By 1990, however, the pattern disappears, and the largest negative output gap during 1992 is about the same for both measures.
Despite substantial differences between CEA and quadratic detrended output gap measures, the parameter estimates in Tables 2 convey the same message as in Table 1 . The timing of the state distribution for the Taylor rule is identical between both measures. For every inflation forecast, δˆ is insignificant in state zero, and positive and significant in state one. As in Table 1 , the null that the inflation coefficients in both states are the same can be rejected at the 1% significance level for every inflation forecast horizon. The point estimates range from 0.75 to 0.80 for h = 0 through 3. For h = 4, δˆ is 1.29. This estimate for the response to inflation is quite high, and the standard error on δˆ is more than twice as large as the lower horizons, which probably reflects the shorter samples for h = 4.
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Turning to the output gap, the results in Table 2 are nearly identical to those in Table 1 for the stabilizing Taylor rule state. The coefficient ω on the output gap ranges from 0.62 to 0.78
and is significant for all inflation forecast horizons. For the destabilizing Taylor rule state, there is no evidence that the Fed responded to the output gap. The coefficient ω is much smaller than in Table 2 , ranging from 0.11 to 0.34, and is never significant. The parameter estimates for the interest rate smoothing coefficient and the innovation standard deviation display no significant differences from Table 1. 11 10 We also estimated our model with a real time Beveridge-Nelson output gap, where the level of output is assumed to be an ARIMA(2,1,2) as in Morley, Nelson and Zivot (2003) . As expected, the sign on the output gap coefficient is negative, since the BN cycle is countercyclical. However, the coefficients are insignificant in both regimes for all 5 inflation horizons. In addition, none of the positive inflation coefficients in State 1 are significant, although we find similar state distributions. 11 We considered an alternative parameterization which allows the slope coefficients to switch independently of the variance of the error term, as in Banaian and Lo (2011) . For our data, the Taylor Principle is estimated to hold for the entire sample, during most of which the response to inflation is estimated to be 4.22. While the Taylor Principle holding for the entire sample is consistent with Orphanides (2004) , the estimated response to inflation in this alternative parameterization is much higher than in any other study that we are aware of.
The View from the Trenches and Beyond
The most direct comparison of our results is to Orphanides (2004) . Using data from 1965:4 to 1995:4, he estimates forward looking Taylor rules for h = 1 -4. 12 He splits the sample into pre and post-Volcker periods, with the change occurring between 1979:2 and 1979:3, and concludes that there was no significant change in the Fed's response to inflation before and after Volcker.
In both regimes the Fed was estimated to have followed a stabilizing Taylor While this is an intuitive break date, it is chosen exogenously and implies only two regimes. Our results suggest that when the break date is endogenized via Markov switching, each of Orphanides' "regimes" contains periods where the Federal Reserve did and did not follow the Taylor principle. We find that not only did the Federal Reserve change their response to inflation throughout the entire sample, but that the timing of these changes in not simply pre and postVolcker. Indeed, for the Volcker years, we conclude that it was not until he had less than two years remaining in his term that monetary policy permanently switched to a stabilizing Taylor rule. This starkly contrasts with the conclusion that 1 ) 1 ( > + δ for the entire sample, or even for the entire post-Volcker sample. While Orphanides concludes that the response to the output gap is regime dependent, we find that the regime dependence is a function of whether or not the Fed is trying to stabilize inflation, not whether or not Paul Volcker had yet taken office. This qualitative conclusion is in accord with the findings of Boivin (2006), Kim and Nelson (2006) , and Leeper (2006, 2011) .
To determine if the difference between our results and Orphanides (2004) is due to endogenizing the timing of the regime switches, or merely an artifact of using a larger sample, we re-estimate our Markov switching Taylor rule for Orphanides' sample ending in 1995:4. The parameter estimates are reported in Table 3 and Figure 3 plots the data and estimated state distribution. The estimated dates of the unstable state are identical to those of the full sample. For every inflation forecast, the estimated value of δ is insignificant in state zero and significant in state one, with ) 1 ( δ + around 1.5. As in Table 1 , which is identical to Table 3 except for the end date, we find that the output gap coefficient is only significant in the stable Taylor rule state (again with 4 = h as the exception). Since we are using the exact same data as in Orphanides Unlike the other studies cited here, they do not employ interest rate smoothing. In contrast to our results, they find that monetary policy was passive from the beginning of their sample until 1979.
Post-Volcker, they estimate that the Taylor principle held, with the exception of 1991-1994 and 2001 to the present. Similar to our results, they find that the response to the output gap was stronger when the Taylor principle is satisfied, although their parameter estimates on the output gap are much smaller than ours.
We also compare our results to Boivin (2006) . He estimates forward looking Taylor rules with real time data, time varying policy coefficients, and heteroskedasticity. In contrast to our framework, he allows the variance of the error terms to change independently of the Taylor The response to inflation is greater than one during the 1980s and 1990s, although only significantly so during the 1980s. They attribute the insignificance of the response to inflation during the 1990s to the decreased volatility of inflation, which caused the federal funds rate to be less informative about changes in inflation, widening their confidence intervals. Regarding the output gap, they find that between 1974 and 1979, the response was positive and significant.
During the 1980s, the response was insignificant, and beginning in 1991 it became significant for the rest of their sample.
14 The most significant difference between our results and those of Davig and Leeper (2006 ), Boivin (2007 , and Kim and Nelson (2006) is the behavior of the estimate of the Fed's response to inflation during the early years of the Volcker period. They find that the response to inflation was not only greater than one and significant, but that the switch to a Taylor Rule state occurred close to the time Volcker took office. In contrast, we do not find that Volker reduced inflation by following a Taylor rule. This is consistent with Volker's answer in 1982 to James
Tobin's question of why he didn't lower interest rates to mitigate the rise in unemployment.
Volker responded that he did not set the interest rate. He sets the money supply, and the market sets the interest rate.
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Due to the model specification and the data used, our econometric modeling framework is more directly comparable to Boivin (2006) than to Kim and Nelson (2006) . Time varying parameter and Markov switching models each have advantages and disadvantages. While
Boivin's coefficients evolve gradually, ours change immediately with the endogenously determined break dates. We restrict the switches in inflation and output gap coefficients to occur simultaneously, where Boivin does not, but our variance switches are chosen endogenously, whereas Boivin's variance break dates are exogenous. The relative success of these frameworks 14 The differences between our results and Kim and Nelson's (2006) results are driven by both our model and our use of real time data. We estimated our model with revised data using two different vintages (2013Q1 and 2009Q1) . We find the same numerical story as when we use real time data, a similar state distribution, but neither the inflation coefficients nor the output gap coefficients are significant in either state. 15 The conversation is paraphrased in Leeson and Taylor (2012) .
is determined by the actual nature, gradual or discrete, of changes on policy. We believe that our framework correctly picks up the 1979-1985 period as being a non-Taylor Rule state because the actual change in monetary policy in late 1979 was discrete.
Conclusions
We estimate a Markov switching model for various real-time forward looking Taylor rules. The estimated Taylor rule equation switches between states where the Fed does and does not try to stabilize inflation by following the Taylor Principle. In contrast to most previous research, the periods for which the Fed either did or did not follow the Taylor principle are not constrained to coincide with the tenure of different Fed chairmen. In addition to the coefficient on forecasted inflation which determines the Taylor principle, the coefficients on the output gap and the interest rate smoothing parameter, as well as the constant term and the innovation variance, are allowed to be regime dependent.
We find that the Taylor principle holds for 1965:4-1972:4, 1975:2-1979:3, and 1985:2-2007 Notes: The interest rate rt is the average Federal Funds rate for the last month in the quarter. Inflation is defined as the year-over-year GDP deflator growth rate. The Greenbook inflation forecasts starting dates are 1965:4, 1968:3, 1968:4, 1973:3, 1974 :2 for inflation forecast horizons h=0, …,4 respectively. Notes: The interest rate rt is the average Federal Funds rate for the last month in the quarter. Inflation is defined as the year-over-year GDP deflator growth rate. The Greenbook inflation forecasts starting dates are 1965:4, 1968:3, 1968:4, 1973:3, 1974 :2 for inflation forecast horizons h=0, …,4 respectively. The Greenbook output gap series comes from Orphanides (2004) . The equilibrium real interest rate is assumed to be 2.5%. 
